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CT
AR
TesTing for forced-choice 
PrecogniTion Using a hidden Task: 
Two rePlicaTions
 
By DaviD P. Luke,* Chris a. roe,** & Jamie Davison**
ABSTRACT: This paper describes two extended replications of Luke, Delanoy, and 
Sherwood’s (2008) precognition effect using a covert task with contingent reward 
or punishment that found performance to be related to belief in luck. In Study 
1, 25 participants completed the short-form Questionnaire of Beliefs About Luck 
(QBL) and then rated the pleasantness of sets of fractal images, which was a covert 
precognition task. Participants in the contingent condition subsequently completed 
a pleasant or unpleasant task based on performance; those in the no-contingent 
condition did not. Overall, participants selected more target images than MCE, 
t(24) = 2.60, p = .02, but there was no difference between the contingent and no-
contingent conditions, t(23) = .73, p = .47. Performance was positively correlated 
with the Chance and Providence subscales of the QBL (r = .48, p = .02, and r = .39, 
p = .05 respectively). In Study 2, 32 participants completed Goldberg’s measure 
of openness to experience, Holt’s Creative Cognition Inventory and Luke et al.’s 
long-form QBL before taking the contingent version of the covert precognition 
task. Participants again selected more target images than MCE, t(31) = 2.01, p = .03. 
We did not replicate earlier correlations between performance and QBL subscales, 
nor with creativity measures, but there was a significant positive correlation with 
openness to experience (r = .46, p = .01). 
in its naturally occurring state among unselected persons, psi may be 
essentially an unconscious process. Broughton (1991, p. 350) considered 
this possibility when he had completed his review of parapsychology and 
was moved to conclude: “it is entirely possible that the sort of psi ability 
that has traditionally attracted the attention of parapsychologists … may 
be aberrations, completely unlike ‘normal’ psi ability.” if this were the case, 
then it would not be evident from collections of spontaneous cases, as these 
rely on the percipient recognising that something unusual had occurred, 
which clearly requires some level of conscious awareness—though this 
awareness may be quite rudimentary, as in rhine’s (1961) classification of 
intuitive cases or hearne’s (1989) notion of a vague foreboding. it might be 
possible for the spontaneous effects of an unconscious psi to be detected in 
more subtle ways (e.g., cox, 1956), although interpretation of the behaviour 
patterns observed in such cases is fraught with difficulty.
But if psi were essentially unconscious, then it might be self-defeating 
to attempt to capture effects in the laboratory by asking participants to 
make conscious judgments about the identity of targets, even where other 
interventions are included that are intended to establish a psi-conducive 
frame of mind—or perhaps even render conscious what would ordinarily be 
unconscious—as found, for example, in dream esP and ganzfeld protocols 
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(Bem & honorton, 1994; sherwood & roe, 2003). asking participants to “be 
psychic” to order while under the scrutiny of lab personnel is likely to increase 
their autonomic arousal and disrupt performance much as it can do for 
other forms of psychological performance (cf. Blascovich, Mendes, salomon, 
& hunter, 1999; geen & gange, 1977). similarly, in parapsychological 
experiments elevated anxiety typically inhibits performance in both Pk 
(see Broughton & Perlstrom, 1986, 1992; roe, davey, & stevens, 2003) and 
esP tasks (e.g., Palmer, ader, & Mikova, 1981; see schmeidler, 1988, for a 
brief review). There seems to be a growing acceptance among laboratory 
researchers that more direct or unconscious measures of psi are more 
appropriate and more likely to be successful, as evidenced by the popularity 
of paradigms that test, for example, for prestimulus response (radin, 1997), 
staring detection (cf. Baker, 2005, p. 60), precognitive habituation (Bem, 
2003), and unintentional Pk (roe, holt, & simmonds, 2003).
Perhaps the earliest systematic laboratory exploration of psi as an 
unconscious process is to be found in stanford and associates’ tests of his 
Psi Mediated instrumental response (PMir) model. stanford has described 
the evolution of this model in extensive detail in a series of publications 
(stanford, 1974a, 1974b, 1990). however, the essential features for the 
current discussion are that PMir suggests that psi operates below the level of 
conscious awareness; is essentially goal oriented, responding to basic needs 
and environment threats or opportunities; and acts by facilitating pre-existing 
responses (actions, memory traces, and so on). hence the participants needn’t 
intend to use psi, nor be aware that the task requires them to use psi—indeed 
it might be counter-productive for them to know this. empirical tests of the 
model have confirmed predictions that it makes concerning the effects upon 
psi performance of (1) the hidden nature of the task (e.g., dwyer, stanford, 
& Zenhausern, 1975), and (2) the existence of a reward or punishment that 
is contingent upon performance (e.g., stanford and associates, 1976).
recently, luke, delanoy, and sherwood (2008) have sought to 
extend this paradigm by attempting to identify those persons who might 
be most likely to capitalise on the action of PMir in their daily lives to see 
if they perform similarly under controlled laboratory conditions. luke et 
al. hypothesised that such people might experience the positive or negative 
outcomes that result from PMir but attribute them to good or bad luck, so 
that if participants reported that they consistently benefited from fortuitous 
events they might describe themselves as particularly lucky whereas if they 
tended to suffer from them they might describe themselves as particularly 
unlucky. luke (2003) had previously identified different characterisations of 
luck that seemed to be relatively independent, and these were represented 
as different subscales of his Questionnaire of Beliefs about luck (QBl: 
luke et al., 2003). luke et al. (2008) were interested to discover which of 
these might be predictive of performance at a PMir task. They recruited 
100 participants who, after completing a battery of questionnaires, were 
individually presented with a computer-based selection task that was 
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described as preparatory to the psi task. This consisted of 10 trials in which 
they were shown sets of four fractal images and asked to record which they 
found most aesthetically pleasing. in fact this constituted a forced-choice 
precognition task, because for each trial after the participant had registered 
his or her preference, the computer would randomly select one image as the 
target. over 10 trials, participants should select the target as their preferred 
image on 2.5 trials by chance alone. if participants scored more than 2.5 
hits, they were subsequently given a reward (to continue the preferences 
task but with erotic images as stimuli), whereas if they scored fewer than 2.5 
hits they were given a “punishment” that involved a dull task in which they 
had to monitor a sequence of randomly selected digits to identify runs of 
three odd numbers or three even numbers. The amount of time spent on 
the punishment contingent task was proportional to the number of hits, as 
was the degree of eroticism of the images in the reward contingent task. as 
predicted by PMir, participants did select significantly more targets than 
would be expected by chance, one-sample t(99) = 2.51, p < .01, one-tailed, 
es(r) = .245. Performance correlated with the luck and Providence subscales 
of the QBl (r = .26, p < .01, and r =.17, p = .05, respectively1), and with 
responses on a single item measuring overall perceived luckiness (r = .26, p 
< .01), as hypothesised by luke et al., but not with the other subscales.
given these promising results with an unselected sample and using 
a straightforward off-the-shelf protocol, we were encouraged to see if 
these effects could be replicated. we planned to recruit participants for 
these replication studies among the general public and felt that it would 
be difficult to secure ethical clearance for the use of erotic stimuli and so 
planned to replace this reward task with an alternative that involved rating 
the relative humorousness of sets of cartoons (taken from gary larsen Far 
Side publications—see figure 1).
we were also aware that as luke et al.’s study did not include a 
condition with no contingent task we could not be sure that above-chance 
performance was due to the subsequent reward or penalty and so planned 
to explore this aspect formally here.
finally, luke (2007) had conducted further psychometric analysis 
of the QBl that condensed the original 41-item scale to 21 items, and the 
current study gave the opportunity to see whether this streamlining had 
any effect on observed relationships with performance on the precognition 
task. Based on previous findings, we predicted the following (note that 
although these predictions are directional, significance thresholds were 
conservatively kept as two-tailed):
•	 Participants will select more fractal image targets in the hidden 
precognition task than mean chance expectation.
1 We should note that, in subsequently revising their paper, Luke et al. reverted to two-
tailed tests and introduced a Bonferroni correction that reduced the Providence-perfor-
mance relationship to nonsignificance (p = .09); however, at the time of the current study 
this effect was interpreted as significant and so we sought to replicate it here.
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Figure 1. screen shots illustrating the fractal image preference task and 
the reward task in which participants rate the relative humorousness of 
cartoons
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•	 The number of hits in the hidden precognition task will be 
greater for the contingent condition than for the no-contingent 
condition.
•	 The number of hits in the hidden precognition task will be positively 
correlated with scores on the luck and Providence subscales of the 
QBl.
sTUdy 1 
methoD
 
Participants
 
an opportunity sample of 16 female and 9 male participants was 
recruited. Participants were members of the public attending a 2-day 
exhibition on superstition at the northampton Museum and art gallery 
entitled “Unlucky for some” and who volunteered to take part in the 
experiment. Participants were told they would be offered feedback on their 
performance in “the luck experiment” if they took part. 
Materials
PMIR Visual Basic program. a software program in Visual Basic (v.6) 
was written specifically for this experiment by the first author. The program 
consists of a fully automated, nonintentional precognition task with a 
randomised contingent/no-contingent outcome task. The program has a 
pool of fractal images as the decoy and target images for the forced-choice 
psi task (example images are shown in figure 1). no images were repeated 
in any run. The entire 40 images for this program were selected previously 
via a standardisation procedure from a pool of 72 such images, which had 
themselves been created randomly (using the freeware fractal generator 
program fractalus v4.02). images had been presented to five independent 
judges via a presentation program written in Visual Basic and standardised 
using a similar rating process to that used in the creation of the international 
affective Picture system (iaPs: lang & greenwald, 1993). images had then 
been grouped together into the 10 best pools of four images based upon 
the homogeneity of their individual scores on scales of pleasantness and 
arousal (luke, 2007). 
Short-form Questionnaire of Beliefs About Luck. a 20-item questionnaire, 
scored on a seven-point likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, 
to assess belief in four polar concepts of luck: luck (“luck” is primarily 
controllable but also internal, stable, and nonrandom), chance (“luck” is 
random, unpredictable, unstable, and inert), Providence (“luck” is reliably 
managed by external higher beings or forces), and fortune (“luck” is meant 
as a metaphor for life success rather than as a literal event). each subscale 
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has five items. The single item concerning perceived luckiness originally 
included by luke (2007) was omitted here because of concerns as to its 
psychometric robustness in comparison to the rest of the measure (luke, 
2007).
Procedure
Participants who visited the museum exhibition were asked if they 
would like to take part in a study of psychic ability and beliefs about luck. after 
participants were recruited, the experimenter took them individually to the 
test room, briefed them about the study, and explained that the experiment 
involved a precognition task, although the nonintentional nature of the task 
was not divulged. They were informed that their data would be recorded 
anonymously but that they could withdraw from the study at any time by 
citing their unique participant identification number. Participants then 
signed a consent form and completed the questionnaire. Participants were 
given detailed task instructions via the computer, and they were then left in 
the room alone until they had completed the PMir computer task. 
The initial screen of the PMir-task computer program asked 
participants to relax and to follow the instructions, and explained that 
they would be informed when they needed to try to use any psychic (psi) 
ability. further instructions described how to indicate which one of the four 
presented images they most preferred for each of a series of 10 “preparatory” 
trials. images were fractal patterns displayed in a random arrangement 
from a unique pool of four images for each of the 10 trials. 
Unknown to participants, the 10 “preparatory” fractal trials were 
actually a nonintentional precognitive psi task. in each trial, once the 
participant had made his or her target selection, the computer then 
randomly selected one of the four fractal images as the (post factum) 
precognition target. Thus, randomised selection of the target occurred 
each time an image preference was selected. This randomisation and that 
of the image position arrangement was achieved using the rnd function 
in the Visual Basic program, which is seeded by the timer. no feedback was 
given to the participant on target success. 
The program also randomly assigned the participant to either 
a contingent or no-contingent condition, with those in no-contingent 
condition ending the experiment at this point and those in the contingent 
condition performing either a pleasant or unpleasant task depending upon 
their performance on the 10 PMir trials. in the contingent condition, 
participants who correctly identified fewer than 2.5 of the precognition 
targets (i.e., who scored below MCE) were directed towards an unpleasant 
vigilance task, whereas those who correctly identified more than 2.5 targets 
were directed towards a pleasant cartoon-preference task. 
The unpleasant vigilance task presented a set of instructions 
describing the task and requesting participants to observe the following 
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display of numbers, and to press the left mouse key (or the return key) 
for every complete run of three consecutive odd numbers (e.g., “3,” “7,” 
“5,”), or three consecutive even numbers (e.g., “4,” “2,” “4”). once the 
task began, a series of singular random numbers ranging from 1–9 were 
presented in the centre of the screen; each digit was replaced every 500 ms. 
duration of the unpleasant task was dependent on degree of success at the 
precognition task: Those who correctly identified none of the precognition 
targets completed this unpleasant task for 4 min, those who identified only 
one correct target for 3 min, and those scoring two hits did this task for 
2 min. none were informed of how long the unpleasant task would take, 
nor did they receive any feedback on their performance. no record of the 
participant’s performance on this dummy task was made.
Participants who performed the pleasant, cartoon-preference task 
were first notified that the task would now change but that they should 
continue to select the image they preferred. however, like the unpleasant 
task, this task was not a psi task and the cartoon images presented were 
predetermined, not random. Participants’ previous nonintentional 
precognition task performance determined how long the cartoon-
preference task continued, such that the task lasted 30 s if they obtained 
three direct hits and increased by 30 s for every additional direct hit.
 
resuLts
we hypothesised that participants would select more fractal image 
targets in the hidden precognition task than mean chance expectation. hit 
rates are summarised in Table 1 and show that, as predicted, the overall 
mean hit rate for this sample, at 3.4, is significantly higher than MCE of 
2.5.
taBLe 1
mean hit rates (anD stanDarD Deviations) for PreCognition task 
PerformanCe sCores, With one-samPLe t-test ComParisons against 
ChanCe exPeCtation
Mean hit 
rate
SD one-
sample t
p (two-
tailed)
Es(r)
Overall performance 
(N = 25)
3.40 1.73 2.60 .02 0.47
Contingent condition 
(N = 13)
3.15 1.91 1.24 .24 0.34
No-contingent 
condition (N = 12)
3.67 1.56 2.60 .03 0.62
our second prediction was that the number of hits in the hidden 
precognition task would be significantly greater for the contingent 
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condition than for the no-contingent condition. we can see that, in fact, 
better performance was achieved in the no-contingent condition, contrary 
to prediction, although the difference between conditions is not significant, 
t(23) = .73, p = .47. we should note, however, that only scoring in the no-
contingent condition deviates significantly from chance, as illustrated in 
Table 1.
finally, we predicted that the number of hits in the hidden 
precognition task would be positively correlated with scores on the luck 
and Providence subscales of the QBl. Pearson correlations are given in 
Table 2 and show that the positive association with Providence was observed 
here but the correlation with luck, although positive, is not significant. 
however, there was also a significant positive association with chance that 
had not been predicted. 
taBLe 2
Pearson CorreLations (With tWo-taiLeD signifiCanCe LeveLs) BetWeen 
PreCognition task PerformanCe anD QBL suBsCaLe sCores
QBL subscales
 Luck Chance Providence Fortune
Psi score .14 .48 .39 .15
 (.51) (.02) (.05) (.48)
scores on the QBl subscales are likely to intercorrelate such that 
zero-order correlations may not be a good indication of the variance in 
performance scores that is uniquely explained by each factor.2 indeed, the 
QBl factors are not orthogonal (luke et al., 2003) and correlations here 
range between .04 and .67. when partial correlations are conducted to 
control for shared variance with other factors, all four relationships reduce 
to nonsignificance (for luck, pr = -.11, p = .64; for chance, pr = .39, p = .07; 
for Providence, pr = .26, p = .25; and for fortune, pr = .07, p = .74).
DisCussion anD rationaLe for stuDy 2
despite the relatively modest sample size recruited here, this study 
was able to replicate luke et al.’s (2008) finding that participants could 
score significantly better than chance at a hidden precognition task. 
although the result is consistent with the prediction derived from PMir 
that psi might operate below the level of conscious awareness and act by 
facilitating pre-existing responses (in this case simply indicating aesthetic 
preferences) rather than by generating novel ones, the claim that this 
process is essentially goal-oriented was not supported as performance in 
the no-contingent condition was actually superior to that in the contingent 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing this to our attention.
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condition, although these outcomes did not differ significantly. The effect 
size reported here for the no-contingent condition (along with that for 
overall performance) is actually larger than that reported by luke et al. 
and so only serves to question the importance of providing a reward or 
punishment for performance. it is difficult to be certain, of course, that 
those in the no-contingent condition did not receive any tangible reward: 
Perhaps subsequently being informed by the experimenter that one has 
done well may provide a sufficient reward to motivate performance—
certainly much other parapsychological research depends upon that being 
the case—or indeed leaving the experiment without having to perform 
either the pleasant or unpleasant contingent task may have been a better 
incentive than either! given this difficulty in ensuring a true no-contingent 
condition, we therefore decided to omit this condition from a second 
replication attempt and instead to concentrate on ensuring that the reward 
and punishment contingencies were sufficiently distinct to be effective. To 
this end, it seemed essential that we include a validation check to document 
how enjoyable those different outcomes were perceived to be.
There was some support here for speculations that those who tend to 
believe in a particular type of luck (presumably based on prior experience) 
may be more predisposed to capitalise on PMir and that this extends to 
fortuitous events that occur in the laboratory. here we confirmed our 
prediction that scores on the Providence subscale would be positively 
correlated with performance at a hidden precognition task, and although 
we were unable to replicate the relationship luke et al. found with luck, 
we did find a significant positive relationship with chance that had not 
been reported previously. These unexpected findings seem to contradict 
luke et al.’s suggestion that it is those who tend to perceive luck to be 
a controllable element (as measured by the luck subscale) who tend to 
perform well on hidden precognition tasks—in this study, those tending to 
believe that luck is random and inert (as measured by the chance subscale) 
actually performed better. Possibly this result may stem from the different 
populations used in the separate studies, with those used in this study scoring 
relatively higher on the chance subscale (M = 4.9) and relatively lower on 
the luck subscale (M = 4.4) compared to the scores in the original luke 
et al. study (where chance M = 4.1; luck M = 5.0), perhaps indicating that 
the magnitude of belief is related to psi performance, such that the degree 
of conviction in a belief and not the belief itself is the determining factor. 
when shared variance among the luck factors was controlled for using 
partial correlations, the significant relationships observed above reduced to 
nonsignificance. This may be unsurprising where all the factors show small- 
to medium-sized positive relationships with performance as well as varying 
degrees of association with one another, but it could suggest that they share 
an underlying factor that itself is related to psi-task success.
we were interested to conduct a further replication that might allow 
us to evaluate the robustness of the psi effect observed here and to clarify 
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its relationship with the luck variables investigated previously (in particular 
to see if we could confirm our unexpected finding with respect to chance 
and our unexpected failure to replicate luke et al.’s finding with respect 
to luck). But we also wished to extend this replication by considering 
other variables that might be expected to covary with performance on a 
covert psi task. To this end we were guided by stanford’s (1990) claim that 
certain attributes  may make a person more or less likely to exhibit PMir, 
particularly when they affect the person’s sensitivity to the psi stimulus and 
likelihood to act upon such a stimulus, and we sought to identify indicators 
of both of these.
The biggest hindrance to (unconsciously) detecting the psi stimulus 
may be the neurological system’s natural tendency to filter out information 
that seems inconsequential to the explicit task in hand, a tendency that 
is evident in the phenomenon of latent inhibition (li: see lubow, 1989). 
individuals who have relatively high levels of li find it difficult to learn 
association rules involving stimuli that are initially irrelevant, presumably 
because such stimuli have been filtered out at lower levels of processing 
(cf. holt, simmonds-Moore, &  Moore, 2008). it seems plausible, then, 
that individuals who score high on li might also tend to be less sensitive 
to peripheral or weak psi signals. li is not straightforward to measure 
experimentally but has been found to covary with other factors that can 
be gauged using pencil and paper measures: for example, it has been 
reported that creative people tend to score lower on li than less creative 
people (carson, higgins, & Peterson, 2003; Peterson, smith, & carson, 
2002), as do those who present as open to experience on the neo five 
factor inventory (carson & Peterson, 2000; carson, Peterson, & smith, 
2002; Peterson et al., 2002). in this study we propose to treat these variables 
as indicators of proneness to li and expect that higher scores on them, 
reflecting lower levels of li, will be associated with better performance at a 
PMir task.
a hindrance to a person’s propensity to act upon an unconscious 
psi stimulus is behavioural or cognitive rigidity. for example, a person who 
is subtly aware of an imminent accident, such as a train crash, may be less 
likely to take evasive action based on any vague sense of foreboding if his 
or her plans are relatively fixed (i.e., the person has already booked a seat, 
has arranged to be picked up at the station or has an important meeting 
to attend) than if they are relatively flexible. a laboratory corollary of this 
may be the stability-lability dimension, where persons at the stable pole are 
characterised as relatively fixed in their thinking styles and persons at the 
labile pole are relatively fluid and changeable; scores on this dimension 
have recently been associated with performance at a Pk task (holt & roe, 
2006; roe & holt, 2006). we therefore expected that more labile persons 
would be more able to act on any unconscious psi signal and so would 
perform better on a PMir task. The lability metric used in these previous 
studies is rather too large to use here, but a core feature was creativity, 
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so we decided to consider one of its constituents, the creative cognition 
inventory (an unpublished measure by holt) in this study.
hence in this study we make the following predictions:
•	 Participants will select more fractal image targets in the hidden 
precognition task than mean chance expectation.
•	 The number of hits in the hidden precognition task will be positively 
correlated with scores on the luck, chance, and Providence 
subscales of the QBl.
•	 The number of hits in the hidden precognition task will be positively 
correlated with scores on the openness to experience scale.
•	 The number of hits in the hidden precognition task will be positively 
correlated with scores on the linear and nonlinear subscales of the 
creative cognition inventory.
sTUdy 2 
Method
Participants
 
an opportunity sample of 32 psychology students from the University 
of northampton was used. no demographic information was collected.
Materials
a software program written in Visual Basic (v.6), used previously 
in study 1 to run the nonintentional precognitive task, was adapted here 
to include only the contingent condition. The original long form of 
luke et al.’s (2003) Questionnaire of Beliefs about luck was used here 
but was supplemented by measures of creativity, the creative cognition 
inventory (cci: holt, 2002), and goldberg’s (1999) measure of openness 
to experience.3
Procedure
Participants were approached and asked if they would like to take 
part in a study of extrasensory perception and personality. if they agreed to 
3 This measure is derived from the international personality item pool (IPIP: Goldberg et 
al., 2006), which was chosen for use here because it is a public domain measure that was 
intended to represent the domain constructs of the NEO personality inventory (Buchanan, 
Johnson, & Goldberg, 2005). Correlations between the IPIP and NEO scales for the six 
facets of the openness to experience dimension range from .70-.80 (Goldberg, 1999), sug-
gesting that these instruments measure the same personality dimension.
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participate, they were then taken individually to the test room, more fully 
briefed about what was involved, and informed that all of their data would 
be kept confidential and that they could withdraw from the study at any time 
without explanation if they so chose. Participants who were willing to continue 
signed a consent form and then completed the questionnaire measures.
Participants were then seated in front of a Pc that provided on-
screen instructions on how to complete the computer-based tasks. The 
experimenter remained outside the test room during the experiment so as 
to be available should participants experience any problems. The first task 
was presented as an activity that was intended to gauge their preferences, 
during which they would be shown 10 sets of four fractal images and had 
to register which was their preferred by selecting the appropriate option 
(see figure 1). for each trial, once the participant had selected one of 
the four images, the computer then randomly selected one of the images 
to be the target. Based on their performance in selecting target images 
across 10 trials, participants went on to perform a second task: for scores 
below the MCE of 2.5 they were directed to an unpleasant vigilance task; for 
scores above the MCE of 2.5 they were directed towards a pleasant cartoon 
preference task. 
for the unpleasant task, participants were presented with a sequence 
of randomly generated digits in the range 1–9 that changed every 500 ms 
and were required to monitor these and respond when this sequence 
involved three successive odd numbers or three successive even numbers. 
for the pleasant task, participants were presented with sets of gary larson 
cartoons and were required to identify which of the cartoons they found 
most humorous.
although participants may have believed that the secondary task 
would be a test of their esP, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant task 
constituted a psi test, and participants’ responses were not processed or 
analysed. rather, engagement in the task constituted the participant’s 
“reward” or “punishment” for performance on the hidden precognition task, 
and degree of success determined the duration for which the contingent 
task continued: Those scoring no direct hits completed the punishment 
task for 4 min, one direct hit for 3 min, and two direct hits for 2 min; those 
scoring three direct hits completed the reward task for 30 s, four direct hits 
for 60 s, and so on, up to a maximum of  240 s.
once their allocated time had expired, participants were asked by 
the experimenter to describe the purpose of the two tasks so as to ensure 
that no participants suspected that the first task required them to use esP, 
and also to rate how pleasant they found their second task on a 10-point 
scale where 1 = not at all pleasant and 10 = extremely pleasant, so as to 
ensure that the intended manipulation of pleasantness of the contingent 
task had been successful.
Because of the element of deception involved in a covert psi task such 
as this, particular care was taken to fully debrief participants in a manner 
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that explained the necessity of the misdirection in order to investigate 
the unconscious or unintentional use of esP. Participants were allowed as 
much time as they needed to discuss and ask questions about the study 
design and its aims and were reminded of their right to withdraw their 
data anonymously at some future point should they so wish; no participant 
exercised this right.
resuLts
To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of the enjoyability of the 
two contingent conditions, we asked participants to rate the secondary task 
they were given using a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all pleasant) 
to 10 (extremely pleasant). Participants allocated to the pleasant task gave 
an average rating of 7.00 (SD = 1.12) whereas participants allocated to the 
unpleasant task gave an average rating of 2.42 (SD  =  0.90), and this difference 
is significant, t(30) = 11.98, p <.01, suggesting that this manipulation was 
successful. degree of enjoyment was related to duration of the contingent 
task for both the reward and punishment outcomes, r (19) = .57, p = .01 and 
r(11) = -.61, p = .03, respectively.
hypothesis 1 predicted that participants would select significantly 
more target images in the incidental psi task than would be expected by 
chance. Mean chance expectation is for 2.5 hits in 10 trials; actual hit rates 
are illustrated in figure 2. The actual mean hit rate was 2.90 (SD = 1.15), 
which, although only somewhat higher than MCE, is significant, one-sample 
t(31) = 2.01, p =.05, r = .34. 
our second prediction was that the number of hits in the hidden 
precognition task would be positively correlated with scores on the luck, 
chance, and Providence subscales of the QBl. we can see from the 
Pearson correlations reproduced in Table 3 that none of the correlations 
comes close to significance, so this study fails to replicate earlier findings. 
when partial correlations are conducted, luck and chance show 
increased positive associations (pr = .26, p = .17 and pr = .27, p = .16, 
respectively) whereas Providence and fortune show increased negative 
associations (pr = -.11, p = .56 and pr = -.22, p = .24, respectively), but all 
remain nonsignificant.
we thirdly predicted that the number of hits in the hidden 
precognition task would be positively correlated with scores on the 
openness to experience scale, and in this study this gives rise to the strongest 
association, with an effect size of .46 that is significant.
finally, we speculated that the number of hits in the hidden 
precognition task would be positively correlated with scores on the linear 
and nonlinear subscales of the creative cognition inventory. These are 
given in Table 3 and, although in the predicted direction, give only small 
effect sizes that are not significant.
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Figure 2. histogram illustrating distribution of hits on the covert precognition 
task
taBLe 3
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DisCussion
Both studies described in this paper were able to replicate 
the precognition effect first reported by luke et al. (2008) and give 
encouragement to the suggestion that this relatively simple paradigm might 
provide a straightforward means of eliciting esP effects with a setup that 
requires no more than a personal computer. The sample sizes in both of 
these replications have been relatively small so that capturing significance 
here suggests that we are dealing with quite a robust effect that merits 
more extensive study. we would like to encourage others to consider 
adopting this approach when pursuing their own research interests, and 
would be happy to provide a copy of the program and some support with 
setting up.
Participants were not aware that they were participating in a psi task 
at the time when they were making their selections, and yet they were able to 
perform significantly better than chance expectation in identifying targets 
that were randomly selected after they had registered their choice. This is 
consistent with the suggestion that psi may be an essentially unconscious 
process (Broughton, 1991), an assumption that seems to underpin a 
number of recently adopted methodological approaches in parapsychology 
(e.g., Bem, 2003; radin, 1997).
interestingly, there are analogous cases in mainstream psychology 
in which performance at a task utilises nonconscious processes and may in 
fact be compromised by conscious attention, and these could shed some 
light on the action of psi. dijksterhuis (2004), for example, has argued that 
better decision-making may follow deliberation without conscious attention 
rather than persistent conscious thought—under some circumstances. 
dijksterhuis, Bos, nordgren, and van Baaren (2006) found that where the 
choices to be made were relatively simple, involving few attributes (e.g., 
choosing between different shampoos) then conscious deliberation tends 
to lead to better decision-making; however, where the choice is complex 
(e.g., choosing between different cars, each described by 12 attributes), 
then better performance was achieved via deliberation without conscious 
attention. dijksterhuis et al. (2006) explain this counter-intuitive finding by 
noting that conscious attention has a low capacity, which allows only a limited 
amount of information to be taken into account simultaneously. They also 
propose that conscious thought involves top-down processing that can 
allow bias to enter the process and so lead to suboptimal weighting of the 
relative importance of the elements of information that are maintained. in 
contrast, unconscious thought is characterised as having virtually unlimited 
capacity so that it is able to integrate much greater amounts of information 
into an evaluative summary judgment (dijksterhuis, 2004: see also Betsch, 
Plessner, schwieren, & gütig, 2001). information is also hypothesised to 
be processed in a “bottom-up” fashion that gives rise to more naturalistic, 
unbiased weightings (dijksterhuis & van olden, 2006).
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we might suppose that incorporating information acquired by 
extrasensory perception into an organism’s decision-making process follows 
a similar pathway—it could be argued that psi tasks such as those used in 
this study represent a form of decision-making in which participants must 
make a summative judgment that takes into account multiple sources of 
(possibly contradictory) information. it would therefore seem likely that 
where psi tasks utilise conscious attention then its limited capacity would 
place greater emphasis on the filtering and inhibition mechanisms that 
have been supposed to exclude psi-mediated material (cf. honorton, 
1977). Tasks that utilise unconscious attention might therefore be more psi 
conducive because their greater bandwith does not require such filtering. 
These speculations are open to empirical test; mainstream research suggests 
that the advantage for unconscious processing increases as the information 
load increases, and this could be investigated in future replications of this 
precognition effect using a covert task.
The method is quite inexpensive in terms of researcher time per 
datum collected and may provide a useful vehicle for further considering 
other process aspects of performance such as personality and situational 
factors. of the factors considered thus far, it seems clear that the fortune 
subscale of the QBl is not related to performance, but each of the other 
subscales has received at least some empirical support across the three 
studies conducted thus far and would seem to warrant further attention. 
The strongest predictor of performance at the psi task was openness to 
experience. This was included as a correlate of li (after carson & Peterson, 
2000; carson, Peterson, & smith, 2002) that might stand as a marker of a 
person’s tendency to filter out irrelevant information. further work needs 
to be done to explore this notion, possibly incorporating other instruments 
such as measures of transliminality (Thalbourne, 2000) or boundary thinness 
(hartman, 1991), or incorporating an experimental measure of li (e.g., holt, 
simmonds-Moore, & Moore, 2008). The measures used to explore creativity 
were included as an indicator of behavioural or conceptual lability, but these 
gave only small positive correlations and were not significant. Perhaps the 
more comprehensive measure used previously (holt & roe, 2006; roe & 
holt, 2006) should be utilised before this suggestion is rejected altogether.
it is not clear to what extent this approach offers support for 
the PMir model. a more extensive and thorough test of the effects of 
providing a contingent outcome is needed than that offered in study 1 
here. it may have been more informative, for example, to retain the 
reward and punishment conditions but have some participants arbitrarily 
assigned to them independently of their performance on the psi task. More 
generally, the salience of a contingent condition needs to be verified so 
that any supposed reward can be demonstrated to be more rewarding than 
just finishing the experiment without performing any further task. clearly 
some tangible rewards and penalties are tied to the participant’s beliefs and 
motivations concerning the task and psi generally, and we would advocate a 
149Testing for Forced-Choice Precognition Using a Hidden Task
multivariate approach to mapping the interactions between factors. finally, 
this design makes the assumption that to be successful the psi task should 
be covert, but this assumption has not been tested and may be unwarranted. 
it would be worthwhile to directly assess the role of (non)intentionality by 
comparing intentional and nonintentional conditions.
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EXAMINANDO PRECOGNICIÓN DE RESPUESTA LIMITADA 
USANDO UNA TAREA ENCUBIERTA: DOS REPLICACIONES
RESUMEN: Este artículo describe dos replicaciones de el efecto de precognición 
usando una tarea oculta con refuerzo contingente o un castigo informado por Luke, 
Delanoy, y Sherwood’s (2008), quienes encontraron una relación con la creencia 
en la suerte. En el primer estudio 25 participantes contestaron el Cuestionario de 
Creencias sobre Suerte (CCS, Questionnaire of Beliefs About Luck) y asignaron 
puntuaciones sobre cuán agradables eran un grupo fragmentos de imágenes, 
lo cual era una prueba de precognición encubierta. Los/as participantes en la 
condición contingente llevaron a cabo una tarea agradable o desagradable basada 
en su desempeño en el experimento; las personas en la condición no-contingente 
no lo hicieron. En general, los/as participantes seleccionaron más imágenes de los 
objetivos sobre lo esperado al azar, t(24) = 2.60, p = .02, pero no hubo diferencia 
entre las condiciones contingentes y las no-contingentes, t(23) = .73, p = .47. 
El desempeño estuvo correlacionado positivamente con las subescalas de Azar y 
Providencia del CCS (r = .48, p = .02, y r = .39, p = .05, respectivamente). En el 
segundo estudio 32 participantes contestaron la medida de Goldberg de apertura 
a la experiencia (openness to experience), el Inventario de Cognición Creativa 
(Creative Cognition Inventory) de Holt,  y la versión larga del CCS de Luke et 
al. antes de tomar la versión contingente de la prueba de precognición encubierta. 
Los/as participantes seleccionaron nuevamente más imágenes relacionadas a 
los objetivos que lo esperado al azar, t(31) = 2.01, p = .03. No replicamos las 
correlaciones entre desempeño prcognitivo y las subescalas del CCS, o las 
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medidas de creatividad, pero hubo una correlación positiva y significativa con 
apertura a la experiencia (r = .46, p = .01).
German
EIN PRÄKOGNITIONSTEST MIT BEGRENZTER WAHL 
UNTER VERWENDUNG EINER VERBORGENEN AUFGABE: 
ZWEI REPLIKATIONEN
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Dieser Artikel beschreibt zwei erweiterte Replikationen 
des von Luke, Delanoy und Sherwood (2008) erhaltenen Präkognitionseffektes 
unter Verwendung einer verborgenen Aufgabe mit kontingenter Belohung oder 
Bestrafung, wobei die Trefferleistung vom Glauben an Glück abhängig war. In 
Studie 1 füllten 25 Teilnehmer die Kurzform des Fragebogens Glaube an Glück 
[Questionnaire of Beliefs About Luck (QBL)] aus und schätzten dann ein, 
wie angenehm sie Gruppen von Fraktalbildern empfanden; darin bestand die 
verborgene Präkognitionsaufgabe. Die Teilnehmer unter der Kontingenzbedingung 
absolvierten anschliessend – je nach erzielter Trefferleistung  - eine angenehme 
oder eine unangenehme Aufgabe, diejenigen Teilnehmer unter der Nicht-
Kontingenzbedingung dagegen nicht. Insgesamt wählten die Teilnehmer mehr 
Zielbilder aus als unter der mittleren Zufallserwartung MCE, t(24) = 2.60, p 
= .02, allerdings zeigte sich kein Unterschied zwischen der kontingenten und 
der nicht-kontingenten Bedingung, t(23) = .73, p = .47. Die Trefferleistung 
korrelierte positiv mit den Subskalen ‚Zufall’ und ‚Vorsehung’ des QBL (r = .48, 
p = .02, and r = .39, p = .05 entsprechend). In Studie 2 füllten 32 Teilnehmer 
Goldberg’s measure of openness to experience [Fragebogen zur Erfassung der 
Offenheit für Erfahrungen], Holt’s Creative Cognition Inventory [Inventar für 
Kreative Kognition] und Luke et al.’s QBL in der Langform. Wiederum wählten 
die Teilnehmer mehr Zielbilder aus als unter der mittleren Zufallserwartung 
MCE, t(31) = 2.01, p = .03. Frühere Korrelationen zwischen Trefferleistung und 
Subskalen des QBL noch mit Kreativitätsmassen liessen sich nicht replizieren, 
aber es zeigte sich eine signifikant positive Korrelation mit Offenheit für Erfahrung 
(r = .46, p = .01).
French
EXPERIMENTATION POUR  LA COGNITION ANTICIPEE FORCE
EN UTILISANT UNE TACHE CACHE : DEUX REPRODUCTIONS
SOMMAIRE : Ce papier explique deux reproductions prolongees par Luke, 
Delanoy, et Sherwood en 2008. Il s’agit de l’effet sur la cognition anticipée en 
utilisant une tache cachée avec une récompense ou une punition qui a démontre 
que la performance est associée avec la croyance en la chance. Dans Etude 1, 25 
participants ont complète un court questionnaire concernant les Croyances en La 
Chance (QBL). Ensuite ils ont classe l’agrément des images fractales qui était 
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une tache cachée de connaissance anticipée. Les participants dans une situation 
conditionnelle ont complète une tache agréable ou désagréable basée sur leur 
performance , mais pas ceux  qui était  dans une situation non conditionnelle. Au 
total, les participants ont sélectionne plus d’images cible que MCE, f(24) = 2.60, 
p = .02, mais il n’y avait pas de différence entre les situations conditionnelles 
et non conditionnelles, f(23) = .73, p = 47. Leur performance était positivement 
en relation avec les échelles de  La Chance et La Providence du QBL (r  = .48, 
p =.02, et r = .39, p = .05 respectivement). Dans l’étude 2, 32 participants ont 
complète les mesures d’ouverture vers l’expérience de Goldberg, I’inventaire de 
la Cognition Créative de Holt  et al.’s forme longue du OBL de LUKE avant  de 
prendre la version conditionnelle de la tache cachée sur la cognition anticipée. 
Les participants ont encore sélectionne plus d’images cible que MCE, f(32) = 
2.01, p = .03. Nous n’avions pas reproduit auparavant les corrélations entre la 
performance et les échelles QBL ni avec les mesures de la créativité, mais il y 
avait une corrélation positive signifiante avec l’ouverture vers l’expérience (r = 
.46, p = .01). 
